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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BYRON R. GRIFFITHS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent) 
vs. Case No. 8154 
SHIRLEY GRIFFITHS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Byron R. Griffiths, the plaintiff and respondent, sued 
his wife, Shirley, the defendant and appellant herein, for a 
divorce. 'I rial was held June 24, 195 3, before IVIarcellus K. 
Snow, sitting as Pro 1-1empore District Judge. Findings and 
Decree awarding plaintiff a divorce were filed July 7, 1953. 
Shirley filed a Motion for a New Trial and Motion to Amend 
the Findings and Judgment, on July 16, 1953, v;hich were 
denied February 4, 1954 (R. 101). 
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The parties were married at Elko, Nevada, Decen1ber 6, 
1943 (R-14). They have no children and accumulated no 
property during the marriage. 
They lived together as husband and wife, without benefit 
of ceremonial marriage, for at least six years prior to their 
formal marriage (R-5) and there is evidence that they had 
lived as man and wife since 1934 (R-35). 
Plaintiff was drafted into the Army December 7, 1943, and 
claimed he married Shirley, the day before his induction, in 
order to protect her with an Army allotment and insurance 
(R-15, 16). 
After induction, the parties spent a short time together at 
Camp Beal in 1944, where plaintiff was stationed before being 
sent overseas (R-16). They carried on their marriage by cor-
respondence during the war years. In 1946, after 17 months 
overseas, plaintiff decided to ask defendant for a divorce, which 
he did in a letter (R-18). While he was overseas defendant 
'\ 
corresponded with the plaintiff about twice each week in mat-
ters of love, affection and encouragement (R-17). Plaintiff's 
desire for a divorce was based on conditions he asserted existed 
prior to his marriage (R-18). Plaintiff left the service in March 
1946 and for three months lived with Shirley as man and v.rife 
(R-19, 20). At the end of the three-month period, he re-
enlisted in the army. During these three months plaintHf 
claimed the parties were in periods of constant bickering (R-21, 
22 and 23~). Defendant admits that there was some argument, 
but that she was merely trying to persuade Byron to keep better 
friends and associates, stop his drinking and cease vulgarity 
(R-37-42). On re-enlistment in June 1946, Byron went to Camp 
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Lee, Virginia (R-25), was stationed there for over three years. 
He went overseas again January 1951 (R-27). He filed his 
divorce complaint November 13, 1952 (R-1) asserting grounds 
of mental cruelty. He returned about one month before the 
trial date (R-28). 
Plaintiff admitted tn his ((Answers to Interrogatories" 
(R-5) that among other things, defendant threw up to him 
the fact that she had contracted syphilis from the plaintiff prior 
to their marriage, and during the period in which she co-habited 
with him. This fact is further confirn1ed in defendant's 
((.A.nswer" (Para. 5, R-9). * 
Shirley Griffiths' Answer to her husband's Complaint 
specifically denies that he had any groun~s for divorce and 
set forth his own misconduct by way of recrimination. She 
asserted that they had lived together for nine years prior to 
their marriage (R-8) ; that there were some quarrels occasioned 
by the plaintiff's laziness and habits with loose and immoral 
friends and ((that she had provided for him during the first seven 
years of their life together (prior to their formal marriage 
ceremony), and that the plaintiff had impaired her health 
through a venereal disease." (R-9). Defendant alleged and 
testified (R-9) that Byron did not want her to go back with him 
to Camp Lee following re-enlistment in June 1946 (R-38), 
but that during this time, they wrote each other affec-
tionately and planned for their future married life (R-39). 
The plaintiff in his correspondence explained how un-
economical it \vould be for his wife to be with him, suggesting 
that he v.:ould try to transfer to Hill Field in order to be to-
* Defendant-is still being treated for this disease. 
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gether (R-40, Exhibits D-2). These exhibits indicate an inten-
tion to remain married during this time. At this time, plaintiff 
was actually living a dual life. He was living with another 
woman, defendant named as one La Verne Burton (R-45) 
at Camp Lee, Virginia. Over strenuous objection (R-45), the 
facts developed in the trial were there (R-65): 
HQ. What did you find when you got there? (Mrs. 
Griffiths) 
A. It was about 10 after 7 in the morning, and I 
knocked on the door and I knocked and no-one ans-
wered, and I looked in the window and my husband 
was there in bed vvith this woman, and I knocked 
again and she said n"'ho is it" and she came to the 
door in this bathrobe and I said nmay I please see 
my husband, Byron Griffiths" and then she slammed 
the door in my face and when my husband came 
out he said ({honey, you could cause us a lot of 
trouble coming here'' and he pushed me down the 
street and we walked. 
Q. And then you two went down the street? 
A. And you know the rest. 
Q. Did you ask him anything about this lady who ap-
peared at the door? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said ({just the girl I spent the night \vith." 
Q. Did he tell you her name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was it? 
A. Well, at that time he didn't. He said it was Virginia 
Godsby who I found was the lady who was renting 
part of the house. 
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Q. And did you later find out •vhat her name was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was that? 
A. LaVerne Burton. 
Q. \'Vas there anything else he said about tl1is La Verne 
Burton when you were walking around the block 
with him? 
A. Not at that time because we went do\vn to get a 
hotel room. I still didn't know what it was all about. 
Q. Then v1hat happened? 
A. Well, he got me a hotel room and then he sent a 
letter to my brother-in-law requesting that he request 
him so that he could be transferred right away and 
then he said he was on charge of quarters that night 
which I found out wasn't right, and then he took 
me to Washington, D. C. as fast as he could. 
Q. And then when you returned, where did you go to 
live? 
A. To Richmond, Virginia, on West Franklin Street. 
Q. How long did you stay there ? 
A. I stayed there about a month before we had this 
apartlnent at Hokeville. 
Q. How long did you stay there? 
A. Until September the 14th. 
Q. What year? 
A. 1947. 
Q. And when did you go back there? 
lL June the 14th, 1947. 
Q. So you were back there for 90 days? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. During that time did Mr. Griffiths ever take you 
over to Pittsburgh or Camp Lee? 
A. Never. 
Q. Did he tell you why? 
A. He said he couldn't be seen on the streets because she 
was known as his wife? 
Q. Who was ((she"? 
A. LaVerne Burton. 
Q. Was there any discussion as to his relationship 
with this LaVerne Burton? 
A. In what way? 
Q. As to their relationship? 
A. Well, he just said he had been living with her and 
that-well, I don't remember exactly what was said, 
to tell you the truth, about her. 
Q. But there was a discussion about them having lived 
together? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you argue and quarrel while you were 
back there at Hokeville, or in Virginia? 
A. I didn't argue or quarrel with him any time because 
he was like a person in dilemma. I didn't say a word 
because I was very ill and there's a doctor back 
there at Camp Lee that knows it. He lived in the 
same apartment where we lived. 
Q. Did you go out with him and meet many of his 
friends? 
A. No. When we went out, we got on the bus there 
and would go to Richn1ond because he couldn't be 
seen with 1ne. 
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Q. When you say he couldn't be seen with you, how 
did you know that? 
A. Because he told me. 
Q. Did you argue and quarrel about this? 
A. No. I didn't even have enough gumption to argue 
and quarrel. 
Q. How did you feel when you found he was living 
with this other woman? 
A. Well, I went down to skin and bones, and was so 
ill I couldn't hardly stand up. 
Q. Why did you return to Salt Lake? 
A. Because I felt like I was dying. That if I stayed 
there, I would die there, 
Q. What was causing you to feel like that? 
A. T'he pressure and the nervous strain that I was under. 
Q. What \vas causing that pressure and nervous strain? 
A. Well, just the fact of what I found and her being 
there, and you know how things are when some-
thing like that happens. 
Q. And then did you return to Salt Lake ? 
A. Yes, I returned to Salt Lake. After I returned from 
back there, he had written me a letter requesting 
me to show I had been there so he couldn't bring 
in desertion against me. 
Q. So you returned to Salt Lake at Mr. Griffiths' re-
quest? 
A. rfhat' s right-! had the letter signed. 
Q. J\..nd you have lived in Salt Lake ever s1nce that 
time? 
lL 'That's right. 
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Q. Since that time, has 1vir. Griffiths ever provided 
you with living quarters so that you could be with 
him? 
A. He has not. 
Q. Have you requested him to? 
A. I did. 
Q. And do you feel that if he would get out of the 
army and live with you and resume your marriage, . 
that you could make a go of this marriage? 
A. Well, I think perhaps we could if he would co-
operate with me, yes. 
Q. Do you wish a divorce at this time ? 
A. I do not. (To the Court) May I say something, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: No. 
Q. Now, did the affair with LaVerne Burton end at 
that time? 
A. No, it did not. 
Q. Now, when did you hear from her again? 
A. Well, the first time I heard from her, she wrote my 
husband a letter when he can1e back from overseas.'' 
J)efendant' s version of the Camp Lee incident as presented 
in his n 1ain case commences at Page 46 of the Record. 
((Q. As a matter of fact, you were there with a girl 
by the name of LaVerne Burton, were you not? 
A. Not alone. 
Q. And she was there in a bathrobe, was. she not? Clad 
in nothing but a bathrobe, is that right? 
10 
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A. I would say that I believe she had a bathrobe on. 
Q. And when she came to the door and Mrs. Griffiths 
announced who she was, LaVerne Burton slammed 
the door in her face, did she not, and wouldn't let 
her in? 
A. No. 
Q. Isn't that right? 
A. No. 
Q. And you got up and came out and dressed with 
just your trousers on, is that right? 
A. I had a shirt on also. 
Q. And then you went out and walked around the 
block, and Mrs. Griffiths asked you who that woman 
was? 
MR. BOSONE: We object to all of this going in the 
record on the grounds heretofore made on all this 
testimony. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
Q. To aid your memory, Mr. Griffiths, did you say 
((that's the v;oman I stayed with last night" ? 
A. I don't recollect that, no. 
Q. Would you say you didn't say it? 
A. I \vould say I didn't say it, yes. 
Q. After that time, you went over to an adjoining town 
and got a room in the hotel for Mrs. Griffiths, did 
you not? You went to Pittsburgh and got a room 
in the hotel for her, isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \vhat did you quarrel about during those three 
rnonths that she was back there? 
11 
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A. I COll;ld prabably name 100 different things. It was 
just about the same old thing. 
Q. Did you quarrel about LaVerne Burton? 
A. At times, probably. 
Q. And who was LaVerne Burton? 
MR. BOSONE: We object to that as being incompe-
tent, irrelevant and immaterial and not within the 
issue of proper cross-examination. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
A. Just a woman of my acquaintance. 
Q. What else did you quarrel about besides LaVerne 
Burton? 
A. I believe things that had happened here in Salt Lake 
-the same old things kept coming up all the time. 
Q. You went to Hokeville after that to live, did you 
not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't you quarrel a great deal because you refused 
to take Mrs. Griffiths to Pittsburgh to any social 
activities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the reason you quarreled and wouldn't take her 
there was because you told her LaVerne Burton 
was known in Pittsburgh and in Camp Lee as your 
wife, isn't that a fact? 
A. Yes. 
After Camp Lee, Shirley returned home and neither of 
the parties lived with the other again as husband and wife. 
Shirley Griffiths did not seek a divorce or counterclaim, 
12 
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but prayed the plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed, ((No cause 
of action." She desired the status of the marriage continue for 
reasons obvious to her. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST 
THE LAW. 
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT T'O SUP-
PORT A FINDING IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST 
THE LAW. 
The basis of the Court's decision in this case seemed to be, 
since the husband proved minor acts of mental cruelty by 
his wife, and there was no desire on the husband's part for 
the marriage, a divorce should be granted the husband not-
withstanding the wife had the substantial grounds for divorce, 
but did not desire a divorce. 
Based on the evidence, the Trial Court's decision is shock-
ing to one's sense of good conscience, justice and decency. It 
n1ay be granted that some marriages are hopeless, impossible 
and serve no social good and ought to be resolved by divorce, 
nevertheless, the dissolution of such rnarriages ought not to 
13 
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be granted upon the complaint of so guilty a spouse. That 
the wife herself desired no divorce and sought only to resist the 
case of her husband was no basis for the Trial Court to con1-
pel one, merely because the marriage seemed to the Court 
to be without worthy purpose and the husband proved nominal 
grounds of mental cruelty. 
The simple point raised by this appeal is, shall a husband 
guilty of serious marital misconduct, be able to force a divorce, 
on proof of mental cruelty, where the wife has the substantial 
grounds, but elects to maintain the marriage status? 
It is a rare situation in divorce actions where each spouse 
is not frequently guilty to some degree. Where each party 
claims mental cruelty or other minor grounds of incompati-
bility on the other, the Courts wisely have adopted the doctrine 
that the party least at fault should be awarded the divorce. 
It has been held in Alldredge vs. Alldredge, 229 Pac. 2d 
681, that acts and conduct on the part of a husband may well 
constitute cruelty to the wife when similar acts and conduct 
on her part may not constitute cruelty to him. In Doe vs. Doe, 
158 Pac. 781, the Court sadi: 
t (Before a decree is granted the husband on such 
ground, it ought to be somewhat of an aggravated 
case." 
This holding has been approved also in Cordner vs. Cordner, 
61 Pac. 2d 601. 
The fact that both parties are frequent! y guilty of grounds 
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In Hendricks vs. Hendricks} 257 Pac. 2d 366, this Court 
I I I I lheld: 
((To affirm that a guilty spouse is never entitled to 
a divorce is a position difficult to apply to the facts of 
life. It is seldom, perhaps never, that any wholly inno-
cent party seeks a divorce against one who is wholly 
guilty. Awareness of this fact and the giving of atten-
tion to the social implications of divorce has given rise 
to various exceptions and limitations on the doctrine 
of recrimination. A realistic approach is indicated by 
the Court in the case of Dearth vs. Dearth, 15 At 2nd 
3 7, wherein it concluded that where mutual delin-
quencies of husband and wife made further living in-
tolerable, a divorce should be granted and the Court 
was not called to balance such delinquencies, but only 
to determine which party was least at fault in causing 
the bad situation. This is based upon the doctrine of 
'comparative rectitude' which is often used and has 
been given tacit recognition by this Court." 
Thus the rationale of the Hendricks decision seems to 
be, grant a divorce to the party least at fault, where they are 
mutually delinquent and where there appears to be no good 
purpose for tolerating the marriage. However, the doctrine 
of Hendricks should not be extended to aid the spouse guilty 
of committing the serious misconduct. 
In Hendricks this Court further said: 
('In vievv of the fact that neither spouse is accused 
of the cornmission of a felony, adultery, or any other 
heinous offense, but the reciprocal claims rest upon 
various acts and commissions alleged to constitute 
cruelty to the other, the trial court would best perform 
its function in the administration of justice by deter-
mining \Vhich party was least at fault . " 
15 
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Bad conduct and poor taste produce bad decisions. An 
objective review of Byron Griffiths' performance and record 
here must find him guilty of the most serious misconduct. 
While the record is sketchy, the implications are clear that 
Shirley Griffiths supported and provided for Byron for some 
6 years prior to their formal marriage, during the time they 
lived as common law man and wife. She contracted a dread 
social disease which he admitted having (R-36). Shirley de-
sired to be his wife and wanted to follow him to army camps 
where possible. Byron didn't want her there (R-38). Al-
though Byron was at Camp Lee for three years, he kept com-
pany with the nother woman" since he arrived at Camp Lee 
(R-83). He actually held out the nother woman" as his wife 
to the community. Why Shirley Griffiths should want to pre-
serve her marriage to this person is entirely up to her. The 
effect of the Trial Court's decision is to compel her to accept 
a divorce she does not want, to reward the guilty spouse 
with divorce because Shirley refused to ask for divorce on her 
own grounds. 
Whatever the basis of the doctrine of ncomparative rec-
titude," the simple equitable rule of nclean hands" should 
bar Byron Griffiths' action for divorce here. 
In an interesting decision, Clark vs. Clark, 225 Pac. 2d 
147, the New Mexico Supreme Court answers the questiop, 
ndoes recrin1ination afford a valid defense in a suit for divorce 
sought on the ground of incompatibility?" There, the husband 
sought divorce on grounds of incompatibility. The wife plead 
recrimination, but asked no affirmative relief. At the trial, 
the wife offered to prove that plaintiff had committed repeated 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
acts of adultery with a named co-respondent. The trial court 
refused to allow her to present evidence of recrimination and 
awarded the husband the divorce. In reversing the decision, 
the New Mexico Supreme Court held: 
((It would be absurd to say that incompatability itself 
could be pleaded by way of recrimination as a defense 
to a divorce sought on the ground of incompatability, 
but as to other defenses traditionally employed by way 
of recrimination, if plead, established and found to 
h~ve resulted from acts of plaintiff, there resides in 
the Trial Judge the discretion to see vvhether, :qotwith-
standing such incompatibility, it shocks the conscience 
to hold such plaintiff is entitled to a divorce by reason 
thereof." 
Judge Snow believed that mental cruelty once made out 
by the husband mandatorily required him to grant a divorce 
regardless of what had occasioned that mental cruelty, or how 
guilty the plaintiff himself was, so long as the defendant had 
not asked for affirmative relief and the marriage seemed hope-
less. This may explain the Court's observation at Page 31 
of the Record. 
((THE COURT: It appears to the Court, as .far as 
the evidence thus far presented to the Court is con-
cerned, that \Ve have a plaintiff here v1ho is asking for 
a divorce and the defendant is not contesting the di~ 
vorce. There is no money involved. As the Court sees 
it at this point . . . " 
17 
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ARGUMENT 
II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A FINDING IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
Divorce is an equitable action. A reviewing Court on 
appeal has the duty and power to determine the facts for itself. 
Alldredge vs. Alldredge, 229 Pac. 2d 681. 
The Trial Court's findings should be upset when the record 
shows such findings are clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence. Doe vs. Doe, 158 Pac. 781, Cordner vs. Cordner, 61 Pac. 
2d 601. 
Since divorce is an equitable action, the record may dis-
close conditions under which the court should exercise its 
sound discretion in either granting or wit_hholding relief and 
in determining the extent thereof. Anderson vs. Anderson, 
138 Pac. 2d 252. 
This case presents a situation where, upon reviewing and 
weighing all the evidence, this Court should substitute its 
judgment for that of the Trial Court. One has only to read 
the findings of fact to recognize how thin is the basis of the 
plaintiff's Complaint and how vainly his pleadors strain to 
ground a basis for support of the Court's judgment. 
Consider paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact (R-95): 
((The Court finds that any ccndonation the plaintiff 
may have extended to the defendant v1as nullified by 
defendant's subsequent acts and conduct of cruelty." 
18 
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This finding implies that Shirley Griffiths' guilt, if any, 
was not erased by the parties living together for the 90 days 
after the Camp Lee incident because of Shirley's actions during 
those 90 days. Such a finding is clearly against the law, and 
insufficient in evidence where the plaintiff's own guilt is so 
apparent and where the plaintiff's own misconduct obviously 
caused defendant's attitude toward her husband during that 
period. 
Paragraph 10 of the Findings (R-95) alleges: 
!(The Court finds that any acts of cruelty or other,vise 
on behalf. of the plaintiff toward defendant up to the 
time the parties resumed living together in Virginia 
(Camp Lee) in 1947 were fully condoned by defendant 
and not thereafter revived." 
In view of the evidence, such a finding is totally unsup-
ported and completely inconsistent with the record. 
Paragraph 11 of the Findings (R-95) further recites: 
I u-rhe Court finds that the defendant was given the 
opportunity before the Court to amend her pleadings 
and counterclaim for a divorce, but the defendant re-
fused to so amend the pleadings and seek a divorce, 
even after all the evidence was in and she was again 
afforded said opportunity by the Court." 
In effect, plaintiff's findings concede that on the basis 
of all the evidence, the defendant was the one "rho was en-
titled to divorce, but since she refused to seek a divorce, that 
in itself becomes some grounds to grant a guilty husband the 
divorce. This concept raises for the first time a doctrine by 
default that although a divorce is conte~ted by the party 'vho 
has the substantial grounds, she must nevertheless be cornpelled 
19 
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to take a divorce she does not wish, if having grounds she 
refuses to counterclaim on her own behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the Trial Court's decision was against 
the law and founded upon insufficient and inconsistent evidence 
and findings. Defendant respectfully urges this Court to re· 
verse the decision and enter judgment in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff, no cause of action on plaintiff's 
Complaint. Defendant further prays that she be awarded the 
sum of $350.00, a reasonable attorney's fee and her costs in 
order to pursue this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of May, 1954. 
A. W. SANDACK 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
1122 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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